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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the validity of the option-based investment model as opposed to the
neoclassical investment model in the decision-making of commercial real estate development,
using aggregate real estate data from Japan. I particularly focus on the effect of uncertainty
because it is the central difference between the two models. I specify a structural model in order
to incorporate the interactions between supply and demand in the real estate asset market. In
order to conduct detailed empirical tests for a long period of time, I set three data series. The
Long Series uses quarterly data of 25 years and Short Series 1 and Short Series 2 use monthly
data of about 15 years. I find strong evidence that supports the option-based investment model.
Especially in the supply equation, total uncertainty has significant effects on the investment
decision. A lag structure is found in the effect of total uncertainty. The parameters for other
variables also generally favor the option-based model. In the demand equation, too, the results
strongly support the option-based investment model. It should be concluded from these results
that various kinds of real options must be incorporated in investment and economic models.
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1. Introduction
We are living in a world of uncertainty. We do not know what will happen tomorrow, or
even in ten minutes. People try their best to estimate the future conditions at their best but also
know that such estimations sometimes succeed and sometimes fail. Even though the estimation
techniques have been refined, the future is still fairly uncertain. In ordinary life, therefore,
people often try to remain as flexible as possible or to postpone their decisions for as long as
possible. People intuitively compare the costs and benefits of fixing the future and seek the best
timing to decide. In business, therefore, a special "insight" that cannot be formally explained has
always been highly valued, until recently, because there has not been any method to consider
explicitly the effects of uncertainty. In economics, however, the recent development of "Real
Options Theory" has started to deal with the effects of uncertainty on the investment decision
and the economy.
Purpose of the study
The purpose of this thesis is to review the real options theory and to examine the
validity of the option-based investment model as opposed to the neoclassical investment model
in the decision-making about the commercial real estate development, using aggregate real
estate data from Japan. The most typical difference between these two types of models is their
treatments of risks. Widely accepted neoclassical investment models account for only systematic
risk on only the demand side of asset markets. However, the option-based investment models
predict that uncertainty significantly affects the demand and supply schedules in a way that the
neoclassical models have not considered.
Uncertainty significantly affects asset markets in several ways according to the option-
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based model. In addition to the demand side effect of the systematic portion of risk shown in the
neoclassical theory, the systematic risk also changes the supply schedule by changing the value
of option to wait in the option-based model. A greater systematic risk shifts the supply curve to
the right because of the less value of option to wait. In the option-based model, the total
uncertainty also shifts the demand schedule by changing the option value to abandon or
redevelop if the investor can choose to abandon or redevelop the asset. If the total uncertainty
increases, the value of abandonment option and redevelopment option increases and the asset
has a higher price. The total uncertainty also alters the supply schedule by changing the value of
option to wait. However, greater total uncertainty shifts the supply curve to the left, which is the
opposite direction to the one caused by the systematic risk. The point is that uncertainty affects
equilibrium price and quantity in asset markets in various ways. In this paper I focus mainly on
the effects on the supply side.
Theoretical works on the option-based model or real options have already brought a
series of rich and persuasive conclusions since the 1970's. Empirical studies, however, have not
been conducted much due to the lack of data. In Japan, especially in Japanese real estate
economics, even the concept of real options is not widely recognized. This study is the first to
examine the validity of the option-based investment model using the Long Series of aggregate
data from the Japanese real estate market.
This paper focuses on the underlying forces on the investment decision in the Japanese
real estate market. The importance of capital investment, especially in the current economic
situation in Japan, is beyond dispute'. The ratio of private capital investment to GNP in Japan is
especially high, ranging between 13% and 20%. Real estate is one of the most important assets
i See Kawasaki and Tsutsumi (1996) for the discussion of capital underinvestment as a main cause of economic
5
in the investment universe. In both the United States and Japan, total capitalization of real estate
is estimated to reach almost a third of all gross national assets 2. Therefore, the changes in real
estate investment significantly affect the Japanese economy. It is quite important to understand
properly the real estate investment decision.
However, there are various unexplained behaviors regarding the investment decision.
This study is important because it may help to explain some of these unsolved problems in
Japan. Why does the monetary policy of extremely low interest rates fail to stimulate
investments? Why do Japanese firms tend to ignore the traditional Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
model in their capital budgeting? Why do new constructions of real estate tend to show booms
and busts? Why do investors hesitate to invest after bad economic conditions even if the
conditions have recovered? Each of these problems is quite important, but is normally
considered the consequence of irrational behavior. Real-options theory may provide a rational
foundation for these seemingly irrational behaviors and a way to quantify the value of
contingent claims. Eventually, real options may alter the decision-making rules in corporate
finance and the policy planning by the government. This paper examines how well the option-
based model explains these problems.
Plan of actions to address issues
I first review the Japanese institutional and economic context in the next section,
particularly focusing on the uncertainty. Then in Section 3, I review the basic real-options theory
and compare it with neoclassical theory, especially emphasizing their implications for the real
stagnation.
2 See Miles et al. (1994) for the case of the United States. See Annual Report on National Accounts (The Economic
Planning Agency) for Japanese case.
estate market. I also review the previous empirical studies dealing with the option-based
investment model. In Section 4, I specify the structural model based on the one constructed by
Holland, Ott and Riddiough (1999). The variables included in the model are asset prices, the
level of investment, expected rent, construction cost, risk-free rate of interest, expected growth,
systematic risk and total uncertainty. I include total uncertainty in both the demand and supply
equation in order to incorporate the effects of various options such as development option,
redevelopment option and abandonment option. The data used to estimate the model is
examined both qualitatively and quantitatively in Section 5. I use three data series that consist of
the Japanese macro data and the aggregate data of the real estate and construction industry. The
Long Series uses quarterly data from 1974 to 1998 to examine the effects under various
economic conditions. Short Series 1 and Short Series 2 use monthly data from 1982 to 1998 and
from 1986 to 1998, respectively. After showing the qualitative relationships between
investments and uncertainty, I examine and specify the data applied to the estimation of the
model. As a result of stationality and co-integration tests, the model is specified using the first
difference of each variable. Two Stage Least Square method is used in the model estimation.
Section 6 discusses the obtained results and Section 7 concludes.
Findings
I find strong evidence that supports the option-based investment model as opposed to
the neoclassical model. Especially in the supply equation, total uncertainty has significant
effects on the investment decision. The estimated parameters indicate that a one-standard-
deviation increase in total uncertainty reduces investments by 19% on a quarterly basis and by
3% on a monthly basis. Total uncertainty affects investments with a lag of two to twelve months
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and these lags have been shortened in recent years probably due to a more competitive market
condition. The parameters for other variables such as systematic risk, asset price, construction
cost, risk-free rate of interest and expected growth also generally favor the option-based model
although some parameters do not show sufficiently strong support. In the demand equation, too,
the results strongly support the option-based investment model. Statistically and economically
significant positive parameters of total uncertainty in the demand equation indicate that the asset
market takes into account real options embedded in assets. It should be concluded from the
result obtained in this paper that the real options significantly affect the real estate investment
decision in Japan, and thus, various kinds of real options must be incorporated in investment and
economic modeling for the use of business, academics or public policy.
2. Japanese Institutional and Economic Context
It is widely considered that
Real GDP (seasonally adjusted)
Japan has entered a period of 6ooo
uncertainty. Japan achieved
400,000
surprising economic development
after World War II. Since the late-
70's until the burst of the notorious
"Bubble Economy" in 1991, the 00 rM..................Mt
Japanese economy had been
expected to keep stable growth3 . Therefore, people considered the Japanese economy and
society fairly certain4 especially from the mid-70's until the late 80's. During the period of the
"Heisei Economic Boom" or "Bubble Economy" between 1986 and 1991, in particular, people
were confident about the Japanese economy and it was widely accepted that the economy would
continue growing into the
Land Price Index (All Use)
foreseeable future. 120
Real estate was especially 100
80
seen as a certain or safe asset to
O 60
invest in because people believed
40
that its scarcity in Japan5 would 20
drive the appreciation forever. The
Data: Japan Real Estate Institute
3 The only big decline in real GDP between 1955 and 1991 was the one after the First Oil Crisis in 1973.
4 The certainty of the society has also been supported by the social systems such as lifetime employment, Keiretsu-
system and industrial policies.
5 Habitable area is about only 30% of national land area.
9
belief of perpetual growth in land value was called, the "Myth of Land Value" and had
permeated Japan. A large number of people struggled to buy real estate hoping for huge capital
gain.
However, after the crash of Monthy return to the market (TOPIX)
the stock market in 1990 and of the
15%
real estate market in 1991, people 1
5%
started to have the opposite mind set. 0
-5%
People lost their confidence in the 10%_
-15%
Japanese economy, and not only -2.,
-25%
shifted their growth expectation
downward, but also recognized that the future is quite uncertain. The return to the market
fluctuates widely today. The loss of self-confidence has initiated restructuring and deregulation
in many areas of Japanese society in pursuit of a new social system in the global economy. The
restructured areas include public administration, the public pension plan, education, financial
industry, construction industry, and airline industry, to name a few. Japanese society is now
changing to a more fast and unstable one that emphasizes self-responsibility. As a consequence,
people think that the future is quite uncertain. People cut their consumption for fear of
unemployment and firms hesitate to start new investment for fear of worse market conditions in
the future. Many industries including real estate have started to recognize the future markets as
cyclical and volatile.
It is worthwhile reviewing the history of the Japanese economy focusing on the
increased uncertainty (see also Appendix for the history of the Japanese economy). Although the
neoclassical model is not the main concern of this paper, for now I will use the neoclassical
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framework to relate uncertainty and the recent downturn of asset prices 6. In Section 6, I consider
how the option-based model can better explain the aggregate economy.
According to the DCF model, the asset price demanded by investors can be expressed
as the following:
,= ci+,
rf +RP-g
where Pt is the asset price as of time t, CFt+1 is expected cash flow in the next period, rf is risk-
free rate of interest, RP is risk premium of the asset, and g is expected growth rate.7
Each of the four variables on the right side of the equation can alter Pt. First, growth
expectation might have shifted downward. A lower growth expectation reduces the price
(- > 0) by making the denominator of the above formula bigger. A small change in the growth
ag
expectation can lead to a huge change in the price. In real estate markets, it is easily imagined
that the disappearance of the Myth of Land Price resulted in a big reduction in growth
expectation. In addition, a lower Volatility of real estate returns
Standard deviation of % changes in real estate stock price index (TSE)
(negative) realized growth might have
0.05 ~~
shifted the growth expectation further.
004
Second, the risk premium 0.03
might have increased. Because 0.02
<0, price must be reduced. The
3RP 0
6 Asset price changes are typically explained from demand side in Japan and typically attributed to the changes in
cash flows, interest rates and expected growth. Or price levels are compared with GDP. See Tanaka (1999) and
Uemura et al. (1997). Other studies focus on the liquidity in money market and arbitrage among asset classes. See
Oya (1990) and Uemura et al. (1997). However, the changes in the risk premium are not usually discussed.
7 I am assuming here a flat yield curve and a constant growth in cash flows.
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the risk premium of real estate. 10
e- 8
Third, expected cash flow of .
the following period might have 4
2
decreased. At least realized cash 0
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flows declined since 1991. Decreased - - - - - - -
expected cash flows drive the price down ( > 0).
DCF,
Fourth, risk-free rate of interest is considered to mitigate the market crash, because
after 1991 it was cut steadily and currently remains nearly zero. Lower risk-free rate is the force
1)P
to raise the price since < 0.
arf
The analysis above is focusing on the demand side of the asset market. If an asset
8 Real estate return and the market return are calculated as daily return on the real estate stock index (TSE) and
TOPIX, respectively.
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market is quite efficient and demand is quite elastic, the above argument can be directly applied
because the equilibrium price is determined by the demand (i.e. the formula above). If the asset
demand has a downward slope, the equilibrium price cannot be determined without considering
supply. The real estate market in Japan is not thought to be a quite efficient market because of
information frictions, transaction costs and traditional business practices. Therefore, I will
specify an equilibrium model in Section 4 to incorporate the interactions between supply and
demand when examining the effects of uncertainty on the real estate asset market, and show
how the option-based model explain well the real estate asset market.
There is a fact that implies the validity of the option-based investment model. Japanese
firms seem to have ignored modem finance theory (i.e. neoclassical models). Japanese
companies seldom use the DCF method in capital budgeting, or even if they do use it, they do
not put much emphasis on it. For example, Toyota Motors Corporation built a new plant in
Japan that was less efficient but more flexible. Toyota made this decision although a typical Net
Present Value (NPV) calculation might have concluded that the plan is inferior. Toyota might
have been seen as irrational by neoclassical standards but the option-based investment model
may conclude that this decision rational. There are a number of similar examples in Japanese
businesses. They might implicitly take into account the real-options value. If this type of
decision governs Japanese asset markets, the option-based investment model may fit the
Japanese market very well.
Apart from economics, real options may help explain several important sociological
phenomena in Japan. The delay of marriage and decrease in birthrate are two important
problems in Japanese society. They are normally explained by such factors as the maturity of the
society, improved standards of living and a high level of educational expenses. However,
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considering that they are the two most important irreversible investments in everyone's life, it is
highly likely that the level of uncertainty affects these decisions.
The decision to marry is highly irreversible in Japan because divorce is uncommon. An
unmarried person has the option to marry, or a call option on the married life. In a highly
uncertain labor market, in which future household income is uncertain, people have more
possibility to experience an economic difficulty if married because higher costs are fixed until
the future. Therefore, recent increase in uncertainty may be affecting people's decision to get
married.
Having children is similar irreversible decision. If the future household income is
uncertain, people have less confidence to have sufficient income to bring up their children. The
value of option to wait (i.e. to have children), which is more valuable in such an uncertain
situation, results in the lower birthrate. Although a statistical test has not been conducted, there
is an interesting relationship between the total special birthrate and uncertainty measured by the
standard deviation of return to the market. From 1980 to 1984, when the uncertainty was at quite
low levels, total special birthrate slightly increased. Since 1985, uncertainty has significantly
increased and birthrate decreased continually. These non-economic applications are not the main
focus of this paper, but they might be very fruitful.
3. Overview of Basic Theories
Treatments of uncertainty
Traditional or neoclassical economic theories did not deal explicitly with risk or
uncertainty until the development of the modem portfolio theory9 and the Capital Asset Pricing
Model'0 . Neoclassical theories did not have a good framework to treat risk until the modem
finance theory was developed. The modem finance theory deals with the effects of risks on the
demand schedule, and shows that only the systematic or undiversifiable portion of risks matters
in equilibrium in the perfectly efficient market, and that the idiosyncratic or diversifiable portion
of risks does not matter. In the financial markets, which are considered to be sufficiently
efficient, each investor can diversify away the idiosyncratic risk and thus, does not require a
premium for that portion. DCF or NPV method in capital budgeting also lies in this framework.
The neoclassical theory, in summary, typically assumes that the systematic risk does not affect
directly the supply schedule and that the total uncertainty does not affect the supply or demand
schedule at all once systematic risks are accounted for.
Source of uncertainty
Investment is expenditure today in the hope of future income. However, almost all
types of future cash flow are uncertain. While this is obviously true of stocks or real estate,
even the fixed-income securities may be in danger of default. The US Treasury bond is probably
a rare exception. Income uncertainty might result from either the broad market conditions or
idiosyncratic events. In any case, few types of assets are free from income uncertainty.
It is true that the investment cost is less uncertain because the timing of expenditure is
9 See Markowitz (1952).
closer, but the cost is not certain at all, either. If the investment takes a relatively long period of
time (such as in real estate development), the future cost is more uncertain than that of today.
Even if the investment is once and for all, the cost is also uncertain if a highly volatile market
affects it.
Even if the future cash flows are certain, we cannot escape from uncertainty because at
least interest rates are uncertain. Ingersoll and Ross (1992) examine irreversible investment
decisions when the interest rate evolves stochastically, and show that even those projects whose
future cash flows are known with certainty have option value for waiting."' The paper shows
that 1) an investment should be made only when the interest rate is sufficiently below the break-
even rate of return, 2) the hurdle interest rate becomes more restrictive as the volatility of
interest rates grows, and 3) a static decrease in expected interest rates for all future periods need
not accelerate investment because such a change also lowers the cost of waiting. The result
indicates that the volatility of interest rates may be more important than their level.
Reversibility and irreversibility
Capital investments such as real estate development are usually irreversible. Once a
developer has paid the construction cost and obtained a built asset, the developer cannot reverse
the decision or retrieve the money in exchange for the built asset. This irreversible characteristic
makes capital investment analogous to the financial option. If an investment is reversible, the
option to invest (i.e. option on the asset built in the future) is not valuable. For a reversible
investment project, the investor will not wait but just invests because even if the situation turns
10 See Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966).
" They assume that the future cash flows are unaffected by interest rates and thus, assume that asset prices are
inversely correlated with interest rates. This assumption might not be realistic in the real estate market although the
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out to be bad later, the investor can get the money back and return to the original position.
Therefore, even if the future is uncertain, if an investment opportunity is reversible, option to
wait does not have value. Flexibility and irreversibility are two necessary conditions for real
options to have value.
It should be noted that the investment option is irreversible even if the built asset can be
sold later. Even if the investor can sell the developed asset to another party, the investor cannot
reverse the development. Therefore, even the option to develop a generic building also has some
option value. The specificity of the asset affects the option of the next level, that is, the option to
change the use.
Difficulty in capital budgeting with the NPV rule
Decision making about irreversible investments under uncertain conditions is
complicated task with the traditional capital budgeting methods. The traditional NPV rule
usually implicitly ignores the option of investors to delay the investment and to make their
decision after getting additional information. People sometimes forget that capital investments
are not usually "now or never" decisions. Although the NPV rule suggests undertaking any
positive NPV projects, it is possible that some projects should not be undertaken if compared
with the plan to invest in the future, given that the investments cannot be revoked. Therefore,
investors may make wrong decisions, even if they undertake positive NPV projects, because
they are forgetting to compare the alternatives of investing in the future.
One way to avoid this mistake is to recognize that investors have more than one
mutually exclusive alternative on different timings if investments can be delayed. Investors can
results are theoretically valid.
choose when to invest although they cannot invest later again if they once invest. If investing
later has a higher NPV than investing now, the investors should choose investing later even with
the traditional NPV rule, because investors should choose the one with the largest NPV when
they have to chose only one project. With this method, however, investors must consider an
almost infinite number of alternatives for each project to decide the optimal timing of
investment.
Therefore, it is quite effective to consider explicitly the value of option to delay a
project when investors try to decide whether to invest or not. If investors explicitly consider the
opportunity cost of killing such options, they can effectively determine the optimal timing of
investment.
Real options theory
According to the real options theory, almost all types of investments are associated
with real options. Real options in investments have been studied since the 1970's and well
summarized in Dixit and Pindyck (1993) and Trigeorgis (1996) in their textbooks. Amram and
Kulatilaka (1999) deal with real options in the context of corporate strategy. Here, I review
some of real options in investments.
Investors who can choose the timing of an investment have the option to delay the
investment (in other words, the option to wait for new information). Thus, land ownership can
be seen as a call option on the asset that would be built on the land in the future (development
option) because the landowner can choose the timing of development (Titman (1985)). With
such options, investors can choose not to invest if they get bad news. Investment is equivalent to
the exercise of the option to wait and thus, it has opportunity costs of killing such options.
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Therefore, investors must consider explicitly these opportunity costs in order to make right
investment decisions.
Sometimes, investments (i.e. exercise of an option) create new options. If the initial
investment creates the opportunity to invest in the follow-on projects, the initial investment
automatically creates the option on the cash flows from the follow-on projects. R&D can be
seen as this type of option. R&D itself does not generate income, but it enables the firm to build
a plant to utilize the results of the R&D. Phasing of the investment is another example. After the
earlier phase, the investor can choose whether to proceed or not, depending on the prevailing
market condition at the time. This right is a call option on the follow-on project. The underlying
asset of real options can be varied, including a growth opportunity (growth option), an asset
with an expanded capacity (option to expand), and an asset of other uses (option to switch use).
We can see such options differently as put option or option to default. For example, an
investor who has the right to stop a phased project is equivalent to have committed the whole
project with the option to stop or default in the middle of the process. The investor gives away
the whole project in return for not investing further. Other put options include the option to
reduce capacity of production to mitigate losses, the option to shut down the facility temporarily,
and the option to abandon the facility forever.
Uncertainty and the other economic conditions change the value of these options, and
thus, affect the investment decision by changing both the opportunity cost and the value of the
investment. The more volatile the future cash flow becomes, the more valuable such options
become. In such a case, both the opportunity cost of killing the option and the value of the
newly created option increase. In other words, total volatility/uncertainty directly affects the
supply schedule of built assets.
Policy implications
The real options theory provides several important policy implications. The most
important is the effectiveness of typical monetary policy. Governments cut interest rates during
recessions to stimulate investment. Lower interest rates are expected to stimulate investment by
shifting asset demand upward. However, it is widely known that the interest rates can explain
investment only weakly if tested econometrically. Japanese interest rates are currently close to
zero, but investments are still decreasing. According to real-options theory, lower interest rates
increase not only asset value but also the value of option to wait. Therefore, both effects offset
each other and net effects on investment are ambiguous. In addition, real-options theory predicts
that the uncertainty may be more significant than the level of interest rates. Thus, even if the
interest rates are low, highly volatile market conditions may discourage investments. This is a
quite reasonable hypothesis in the current Japanese economy. The results of the empirical tests
of this paper support this hypothesis.
The policy implications of real options are not limited to monetary policy. More
generally, too frequent policy changes such as reforms of tax system and subsidizing programs
would make profitability of firms more uncertain and may have side effects on the investment
decision. Although this uncertainty caused by public policy is normally overlooked, it may be
quite important.
Implications for real estate
Real options theory is quite effective when analyzing the real estate market because the
various options are naturally embedded in real estate. Option theory was first applied to real
estate by Titman (1985). In the paper the vacant urban land is viewed as an option to purchase
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one of a number of different possible buildings at exercise prices that are equal to their
respective construction costs. The paper applies option valuation methods developed by Black
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) and shows that the vacant land becomes more valuable
as uncertainty about future prices increases. Williams (1991) constructs a model of real estate
development as an option, in which both the optimal timing and scale of development is
analyzed. Capozza and Sick (1991) discuss the value of redevelopment option. They show that
the discount of leased properties from fee-simple properties, which cannot be explained with
simple NPV models, can be explained largely by the option to upgrade or redevelop.
The value of land use flexibility and land use choice are also analyzed using option-
pricing theory. Capozza and Helsley (1990) show that uncertainty (1) delays the conversion of
land from agricultural to urban use, (2) imparts an option value to agricultural land, (3) causes
land at the boundary to sell for more than its opportunity cost in other uses, and (4) reduces
equilibrium city size. Childs, Riddiough and Triantis (1995) consider how the potential for
mixing uses and for redevelopment impact property value, and show that operating flexibility
increases property value and also affects the timing of initial land development. Geltner,
Riddiough and Stojanovic (1996) consider the effect of land use choice on speculative land
value and on development timing, and show that land use choice or multiple-use zoning may
add over 40% to land value under typical economic circumstances.
Aggregate behaviors of real estate markets are also analyzed with real options theory.
Real estate markets are notorious for their behavior of big booms and busts. An orthodox
explanation of such behavior is provided by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996) and Wheaton
(1999) using stock-flow models, which do not account for uncertainty. According to them, the
major causes of long and big cycles are 1) backward-looking expectations, 2) long construction
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lags, 3) the durability of real estate and 4) relative elasticity of supply. Other studies explain the
cyclicality by the agency problem in non-recourse financing. With non-recourse financing,
developers would lose nothing even in the case of overbuilding. Thus, developers continue
construction as long as they get financing.
Alternatively, Williams (1993) considers the aggregate effects of the exercise of
development options on demand and derives an equilibrium set of exercise strategies for real
estate developers. The paper focuses on four distinguishing characteristics of real assets, that is,
1) demand for the good or service produced by a real asset has a finite elasticity, 2) developers
have finite capacities, 3) the supply of options can be limited, and 4) developers can be less than
perfectly competitive. This shows that all developers, in the equilibrium, build at the maximum
feasible rate whenever income rises above a critical value. Grenadier (1995a) shows that the
increase in any of the following -construction time, adjustment cost of changing occupancy
rates or demand volatility- will lead to overbuilding. This paper also examines hysteresis in
vacancy rates on the fully developed rental property. Grenadier (1996) goes a step further and
provides a rational foundation of overbuilding in real estate markets using game-theoretic
approach in an equilibrium framework. The paper analyzes the equilibrium exercise strategies of
development options in both duopoly market and competitive market. It demonstrates that, in
the case of symmetric duopoly, either simultaneous or sequential exercise of development
options may take place depending on the initial conditions and parameter values. And it argues
that the simultaneous exercises (building booms) following a downturn in demand may be the
result of rational fear of preemption rather than of irrational overbuilding. Riddiough (1997)
examines incentive and valuation effects of debt financing on land investment, focusing on a
development option on the land and a default option on the debt that the landowner usually
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holds. The paper shows that a higher debt level may lead to delay in investment or
underinvestment. Wang and Zhou (1999) allow a stochastic process in construction costs in their
model and derive the optimal exercise strategies under various settings.
Empirical studies
Unlike rich theoretical works on real options, empirical studies have been less
conducted. Some of the empirical studies to be noted are Pindyck and Solimano (1993), Quigg
(1993), Holland, Ott and Riddiough (1999) and Moel and Tufano (1999). Although the number
and area of empirical studies are insufficient, each study shows significant support to the option-
based investment model.
Pindyck and Solimano (1993) conducted an empirical study using aggregate data of 29
countries. Their study also suggests that the volatility of the marginal profitability of capital - a
summary measure of uncertainty - affects investment as the option-based theory suggests, but
the size of the effect is moderate, and is greatest for developing countries. Quigg (1993)
examines the empirical predictions of a real option-pricing model using a large sample of urban
land transaction data. The paper concludes that market prices reflect a premium for the
development option and that the option model has explanatory power for predicting transaction
prices. Holland, Ott and Riddiough (1999) have examined the validity of option-based method
using aggregate real estate data in the United States. Their study generally favors predictions of
the option-based model, and hence suggests that irreversibility and delay are important
considerations to investors. Regarding individual companies' decision-making, Moel and
Tufano (1999) use the data of 285 gold mines and confirm many of the predictions from real
options models. Specifically, they show that closures of mines are influenced by the price and
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volatility of gold, firms' operating costs, proxies foreclosing costs, and the size of reserves. It
also shows strong evidence of hysteresis.
In the next section, I will specify a structural model based on Holland, Ott and
Riddiough (1999) in order to test the effect of uncertainty in an equilibrium setting.
4. Model Specification
In this paper I use an equilibrium model to describe the commercial real estate asset
market because it is necessary in the real estate market to incorporate the effect of new
investment on asset demand. In efficient and competitive markets, the demand curve is perfectly
elastic and price can be set exogenously. However, the real estate market is considered to be less
efficient12 because of high transaction costs, capital constraints, information frictions, long-term
leases and construction lags. The commercial real estate market is less competitive, too, because
each development project is fairly large and accounts for a significant part of the whole supply.
Although the early studies of real options dealt with partial equilibrium and set asset price
exogenously, recent studies typically use equilibrium models to incorporate the interactions
between supply and demand. In such models, the demand curve is not limited to an extreme case
(e.g. demand elasticity is infinite).
The model used in this thesis is basically the same as the one used in Holland, Ott and
Riddiough (1999), although the data specification is different.
Pt= fD (C, R, r, g, GPM, a) (1)
Ct = fs (P, K, r, g, Gp,M, a) (2)
where Pt is asset price as of time t, Ct is new investment as of time t, R is expected rents, r is
risk-free rate of interest, g is expected growth rate in rents, orm is systematic risk of real estate,
a is total uncertainty of real estate return, and K is construction cost .
1 Some blame backward looking expectations of developers as a large source of inefficiency in real estate markets
although it is not clear whether such expectations are special in real estate markets.
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Equation (1) expresses the demand of built assets. Pt, the willingness to pay for built
assets by investors, is considered to be determined by C, R, r, g, Gp,M, and Y. In this equation I
include a as well as other
Figure 1
traditional factors because
Asset Market R Property Market
redevelopment option and (Demand side) (Demand side)
abandonment option, the value of
which is determined by total Stock
P
uncertainty, may affect the
demand schedule. I also include
new investment (C) in the demand Asset Market Property Market(Supply side) C (Supply side)
equation in order to incorporate
the effects of new investment on asset demand in real estate markets as mentioned above. This
equation represents the demand side of asset market (the second quadrant in Figure 1), which is
illustrated in the four-quadrant market model by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996)".
Equation (2) represents the supply side of real estate (the third quadrant in Figure 1). I
include some independent variables that are normally omitted in neoclassical models, based on
the option-based investment model. Even from those variables normally used in neoclassical
investment models, somewhat different effects on investments are expected.
First, I include a, or total uncertainty in return, in this equation because the value of
option to wait is considered to affect the supply schedule. Greater a should shift the supply
schedule leftward (S->S' in Figure 2) at least in the short run because option to wait becomes
13 Although this four-quadrant model is a static one, which deals with long-run equilibrium while this paper deals
with rather short-term dynamic behavior, this four-quadrant model provides a good overall picture of real estate
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more valuable. Neoclassical investment
Figure 2: Effects on asset markets of
models take risks into account only by the 1) A greater total uncertainty
systematic portion and only through the 2) A smaller systematic risk
3) A lower interest rate
demand side. The idiosyncratic portion is 4) A higher expected growth rate
ignored because it is diversifiable and thus Asset
Price
does not alter the risk premium and the
demand schedule. However, the option-
P2
based model predicts that greater total
uncertainty would shift 1) the demand
D
schedule upward (D 4D') because the
abandonment option or the redevelopment Q2 Q* Qilnvestment
option becomes more valuable and 2) the
supply schedule to the left (S-S') because more developers would decide to delay new
investment.
Second, ap,m, or systematic risk itself, may play a role somewhat different from the role
in the neoclassical framework. A smaller systematic risk (i.e. a smaller risk premium and a
lower discount rate) makes the future cash flows relatively more valuable. It not only increases
the asset value but also changes the value of various kinds of options. The value increases in the
redevelopment option on the demand side and the option to wait on the supply side but
decreases in the abandonment option on the demand side. Thus, a smaller systematic risk not
only shifts the demand curve upward (D+D')1 4 , but also shifts the supply curve leftward
markets. This paper primarily focuses on the asset market, which is the left side of the figure.
14 Here, I assume that the increase in the asset value is more than the decrease in the value of abandonment option.
Thus, the demand schedule eventually shifts upwards.
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(S4S') because of the increased value of option to wait on the supply side.
Third, r, or the level of interest rate (i.e. risk free rate of interest) may have an effect on
investment similar to that caused by systematic risk. A lower interest rate, ceteris paribus, also
results in a lower discount rate and shifts the demand upward (D4D')' . Therefore a lower
interest rate is normally (i.e. in the neoclassical models) expected to stimulate investment.
However, option-based investment models predict some offsetting effects in terms of quantity,
that is, a lower interest rate may shift the supply schedule to the left (S*S') by increasing the
value of option to wait, and thus may even reduce the quantity supplied.
Last, g, the expected growth rate on rents, is normally considered to change the demand
by changing capitalization rate. A higher growth expectation, ceteris paribus, leads to a higher
asset price and more investment. The option-based models predict that the expected growth rate
on rents also changes the supply schedule by altering the opportunity cost to wait. A higher
growth in the future rents makes foregone cash flows while waiting (i.e. opportunity cost to
wait) relatively less important. Therefore, a higher expected growth rate may lead to waiting and
reduce new investment (shift the supply schedule to the left) in the short run.
The effects of each independent variable on the supply schedule are summarized in
Table 1. The clearest difference between the two models is the effect of total uncertainty. While
the neoclassical model predicts no effect on supply, the option-based model predicts a negative
15
effect.
15 It should be noted that, according to the option-based model, the net effects on the equilibrium level of
investments are ambiguous because both supply and demand shift.
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Table 1: Effects of independent variables on supply (C)
Neoclassical model Option-based model
Total Uncertainty -0 -- < 0
Systematic risk =0 >0
a P,M GPM
Interest rate 
- =0 >0
Dr ar
Growth rate ac=0 <0
ag ag
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5. Data Specification
Data description
I use time series data and run three regressions to test the parameters in the model. The
data are obtained from the Japan Development Bank, Ministry of Construction, Tokyo Stock
Exchange, Data Stream, Economic Planning Agency, National Land Agency, Ikoma Data
Service Systems and Sumitomo Trust Bank. The first regression is conducted using a long series
of quarterly data from 1974 to 1998 (I refer to this as the Long Series in this paper). As shown
in Appendix, this period includes four expansions and five recessions of the Japanese economy.
The results of the Long Series are quite credible since the data are not limited in a special
period. For the second and the third regression I use more recent monthly data of relatively short
periods in order to examine in detail the recent investment decision. The second regression is
from 1982 to 1998 (I refer to this as Short Series 1) and the third regression is from 1986 to
1998 (Short Series 2). Both of these periods correspond to a highly volatile period after the
globalization of the Tokyo financial market. The data that are used as the variables in equation
(1) and (2) are as follows.
1. Construction / Investment (C): For the Long Series, I use the log of capital investment value
measured by million yen in real terms. The data is obtained from the Economic Planning
Agency. For Short Series 1, I use the log of Private Building Construction Started measured
by thousand square meters (Ministry of Construction), and for Short Series 2, the log of
Integrated Statistics on Construction Work measured by million yen in nominal terms
(Ministry of Construction). The choice of whether to use real or nominal series for all other
variables depends on whether the investment data are in real or nominal terms. Therefore,
the Long Series and Short Series 1 are expressed in real terms and Short Series 2 is
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expressed in nominal terms. The real series are generated by deflating the nominal series by
GDP deflator. Judging from relatively low inflation rates in Japan, especially during the
period of Short Series 216, the choice would not affect the results significantly. In each
series, I use the data of private non-dwelling construction or commercial real estate because
the housing market is driven by demographic and life-style changes rather than by
profitability. In addition, the housing market in Japan is highly affected by the government
through public financing and direct supply by the public sector.
2. Price of real estate (P): Price is proxied by the log of the stock price index for the real estate
industry provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Japanese real estate companies usually
hold real estate assets perpetually. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that the stock
price index of real estate companies represents the real asset value held by the companies.
The validity of the use of the stock price is also confirmed by Quan and Titman (1999).
They show that the contemporaneous relation between yearly real estate price changes and
17stock returns is quite high (0.84) and statistically significant in Japan".
3. Expected rent (R): Expected rent is proxied by the log of the periodic rent indicator realized
one period hence. The periodic rent indicator is calculated by multiplying the estimated real
estate prices by the cap rate. I use as the cap rate the income yield of MTB-IKOMA Real
Estate Investment Index. I linearly extrapolate the annual cap rate of the index to generate
quarterly and monthly data 8 .
4. The cost of construction (K): I use the Construction Cost Deflators of Integrated Non-
16 Inflation rates between 1986 and 1998 are less than 3%.
17 Their paper examines the correlation between real estate price and the price of market portfolio. Although the
comparison does not directly apply to my paper, it is fair to say that the stock price of real estate industry has higher
correlation with real estate price than market portfolio.
18 1 assume that the cap rate is relatively sticky, which would be valid judging from the data in the US. In fact, the
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dwelling obtained from the Ministry of Construction.
5. Risk-free rate of interest (r): I use the simple yields on Japanese Government Bonds (8-10
years) listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange selected with longest remaining maturity. The
data are obtained from Datastream.
6. Expected growth rates (g): I use lagged values of the real GDP growth rates as a proxy of
expected growth rates. The current values cannot be used because of the endogeneity
problems. Construction or real estate investment is a part of GDP and thus, current GDP
cannot be used as exogenous variables.
7. Systematic risk (ap,m): Systematic risk is proxied by the covariance of returns to commercial
real estate and returns to the market. I assume that the daily returns to real estate and to the
market are represented by the daily changes of the log of real estate stock price index and of
TOPIX, respectively. Both real estate stock price index and TOPIX are provided by the
Tokyo Stock Exchange. For the Long Series, I take covariance of these data for 90 trading
days previous to the end of each period, and previous 25 trading days for Short Series 1 and
192.
8. Total uncertainty (a): Total uncertainty is proxied by the standard deviation of returns to
commercial real estate. I take daily differences of the log of real estate stock price index as
daily returns to commercial real estate. I use the same method as used for the covariance;
that is, I take standard deviation of 90 trading days previous to the end of each period for the
Long Series, and previous 25 trading days for the two Short Series.
income yields of MTB-IKOMA Index, which is currently the best to be obtained in Japan, change smoothly over
time rather than stochastically. However, the rent indicator moves stochastically by the price change.
19 The period to take covariance and standard deviation is determined so that the overlaps are minimized without
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Preliminary qualitative examination of the data
Figure 3 shows the relationships between investments and total uncertainty from 1974
using the Long Series, and Figure 4 shows the recent relationships. Although formal statistical
tests are not yet conducted, some notable strong relationships should be recognized. First of all,
from the late 70's to the early 80's, Japan experienced a long-term decrease in uncertainty. In the
same period, investments gradually increased.
Second, in both uncertainty and investments during the same period, there seem to be
medium-term cycles, each of which extends about two years. In addition, it seems that
investments move in the opposite direction to uncertainty lagging about one year. Considering
that it typically takes one or two years since the planning phase until investments in real estate
development, it seems reasonable to suppose that the effects of uncertainty on investments have
one- or two-year lags. It is not reasonable for real estate development to suppose that the current
uncertainty affects the current investment because the construction schedule cannot be easily
changed once the development plan is approved and construction is contracted. This medium-
term relationship continues until the 90's.
Third, since the mid-90's, both the cycles and lags has become shorter than before.
Figure 4 shows the recent relationship in detail. After 1997, there is also a strong inverse
relationship between investment and uncertainty. However, the cycles are about one year and
lags seem about two to four months.
The results of more rigorous statistical tests are explained in Section 6.
wasting data.
Figure 3
Relationship between investments and uncertainty (Long Series)
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Quantitative examination of the data
Here I examine the stationarity and co-integration of the data so that the appropriate
OLS estimators can be obtained. First, each series is examined for nonstationarity using
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (see Dickey and Fuller (1979 and 1981)). I fail to reject
nonstationarity for asset prices (P), investment (C), construction cost (K), rent (R), risk-free rate
of interest (r), systematic risk (oP,M), total uncertainty (s). Therefore, I assume that these series
are nonstationary. On the other hand, I can reject nonstationarity only for expected growth rate
(g) and thus, I assume that this series is stationary.
Next, I examine co-integration among nonstationary series using Engle and Granger's
(1987) method in order to examine whether the variables can be directly used in regressions. I
do not find any evidence of co-integration among the series. Therefore, the error term in any
regression with C is likely to be nonstationary, and the estimated parameters may be biased and
inconsistent. In order to make the error term stationary, I use the first differences of all of the
nonstationary series. Also, in order to keep consistency, I take the first differences of expected
growth rate, which is already stationary. Details of the examination above are explained in
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998), Chapter 16. I used Eviews 3 for the tests in this paper.
Re-specification of the model
Based on the examinations above, I specify a linear model of asset market equilibrium
as follows:
APt = o +c 1AC +aC2AR +a 3Ar +a4Ag +c5Aap,m +MaAa +Acp (3)
ACt = o +fiAP +f 2AK +P3Ar +$4Ag +P5AarPM +$6Aa +AEc (4)
where AEp and Acc are assumed to have independent normal distributions.
I include not only current values but also lagged values of all the independent variables
except for Ag and AR. The current and lagged values for AP, AK, Ar, Aup,M and AG are included
because lagged values of independent variables are considered to affect the current dependent
variable. The preliminary qualitative examination of data shows the possibility of lags up to two
years. The long construction periods are an important characteristic of real estate development,
and it is quite usual that an investment was decided more than a year before. The specific
method to determine the lags to include is as follows:
First, lags are included continually up to the point where the last addition improves
2
adjusted-R , with the maximum lag of 2 years (i.e. 7 lags for the Long Series and 23 lags for
Short Series). For example, the 7th lag is included only if adjusted-R 2 is improved by including
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the 7th lag in addition to the current and lagged values from the first to the 6th. Once the highest
adjusted-R 2 is achieved using the continuous lags, each of the variables is examined to find
whether it improves the adjusted-R 2 or not. A variable is removed if the removal of it improves
the adjusted-R 2. Therefore, only the variables that satisfy the adjusted-R 2 are included in the
final model.
For Ag, lagged values are included but the current one is not because of the endogeneity
problem mentioned in the data description. For AR, not only are the current and lagged values
included, but also one period forward realized rent is included, because the current price is
determined by the expected future rents if investors are forward looking.
As a result of this method, some of the independent variables may be excluded in the
final model. Now, the model can be specified as follows:
APt = aO +a1IAC +aX2AR +a3cAr +ax4Ag +C5AaP,M +aoIAa +AEp (3)
ACt = Po +f 1ZAP + 2XAK +f33Ar +P41Ag +P5Aap,m +f 6XAa +AEC (4)
where I denotes the sum of the forward, current and lagged values as explained above. It should
be noted that some variables might not appear in the final result of regression because of the
lack of significance in explaining the dependent variable. Seasonal dummies are also included to
account for the strong seasonality of investment variables.
To estimate the parameters, Two Stage Least Square procedure is employed.
6. Results and Discussion
The estimated parameters on the supply equation and the signs of parameters predicted
by the option-based model are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Estimates of the Structural Supply Equation
Predicted Long Series Short Series 1 Short Series 2
signs 1974:4-1998:2 1982:4-1998:11 1986:2-1998:11
Po (Constant) ---- ---- -1.95x10-2
(3.39x10-')
P, (for ZAP (Asset + 4.03x10' ---- 2.50x10'
Price)) (2.50x104) (8.32x10-2)
P2 (for ZAK . -4.80x10-3 -1.60x10-2 3.12x10-2
(Construction Cost)) (3.07x10 2) (1.50x10-2) (1.06x10-2)
P3 (for XAr (Risk-free + -3.25x10- -9.40x10' 7.20x10-'
Rate of Interest)) (2.47) (1.80) (5.19x10-1)
4 (for XAg (Expected _ 3.19 1.02x10 5.70
Growth)) (3.43) (2.19) 1.09
s5 (for EAGp,M + 9.19x102 ---- 2.11x1O'
(Systematic Risk)) (3.90x10 2 ) 2.27x10'
P6 (for IAa (Total - -3.78x101 -4.71 -4.92x10-
Uncertainty)) (1.21x10') (1.66) (5.24x10-)
R2 0.76 0.84 0.98
Adjusted- R2 0.67 0.79 0.98
S. E. of Regression 0.16 0.05 0.02
Durbin-Watson 2.10 2.00 1.95
The dependent variable is the change in the log of 1) capital investment value (million yen) for
Long Series, 2) Private Building Construction Started (thousand square meters) for Short Series
1, and 3) Integrated Statistics on Construction Work (million yen) for Short Series 2. The
coefficients of seasonal dummies are not shown. Coefficient standard errors are in parenthesis.
In order to examine the effect of uncertainty on the investment decision, I start with 6,
the parameter for total uncertainty (a). In all series, the signs of parameters are negative, which
is consistent with the real-options theory. Especially the results in the Long Series and Short
Series 1 are statistically significant at the one-percent level. Even in Short Series 2, if only the
lagged values of uncertainty, each of which is a statistically significant explanatory variable, are
concerned, they negatively affect investments2 0 . The results show that the increase in volatility
of real estate return shifts the supply schedule of built assets to the left, that is, reduce new
investments. This result strongly supports the validity of the option-based investment model
because this effect is the heart of the model.
The sizes of parameters indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in total
uncertainty reduces investments by 19% on a quarterly basis and by 3% on a monthly basis.
Therefore, if the standard deviation of daily return of the previous quarter increase by 1%,
investments decrease by nearly 40% in a quarter. If considered with monthly intervals, a one-
percent increase in the standard deviation of daily return reduces investments by about 5% in a
month.
The lag structures between total uncertainty and investments are consistent with the
preliminary qualitative examination of the data. In the Long Series, which deal with quarterly
data, 1-, 2- and 4-quarter lags of total uncertainty are finally included in the model. 2- and 4-
quarter lags are especially significant in explaining the current change in investments at the 5%
and 1% level, respectively. In Short Series 1, 4- and 7-month lags are especially significant at
the 1% level, and in Short Series 2, 2- and 4- month lags are especially significant at the 5% and
1% level, respectively.
2 The reason why the sum of coefficients for total uncertainty is not statistically significant is that the sign of
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This result is also consistent with the hypothesis that the lags are becoming shorter in
recent years because the Short Series tend to show shorter lags than the Long Series. The reason
for the shorter lags may be the current highly competitive business condition of the construction
industry. The capacity of the construction industry exceeds the demand in the 1990's. There is
less supply constraint in development and thus, developers can advance projects relatively
quickly when the conditions become favorable. Even when the conditions turn worse,
construction companies are flexible in order not to lose their businesses.
Systematic risk (cp,m) is expected by the option-based model to have a positive effect
on investments while neoclassical theory predicts no effect on asset supply once asset prices are
controlled . The result of the Long Series indicates that the systematic risk has a significant
positive effect on investments (i.e. on the supply schedule) at the 2% level. Short Series 2 also
shows a positive sign but the result is not so significant. Although the data of the Short Series
are not sufficient to support the option-based model, at least they are not inconsistent with
neoclassical theory. Based on the coefficient from the Long Series, a one-standard-deviation
increase in systematic risk stimulates investments by about 10% in a quarter, which is
economically significant. It is confirmed that distinguishing total uncertainty and systematic risk
is quite important.
Price (P) parameters show positive signs, which are considered with both the option-
based model and the neoclassical model, although the statistical significance and sizes of
coefficients are not so large. Short Series 2 supports this basic notion at the 1% level, and the
Long Series marginally supports almost at the 10% level, but Short Series 1 does not provide
coefficient for the current value is opposite to those for the lagged values.
21 The net effect of systematic risk on equilibrium level of investment is ambiguous due to the shifts of both supply
and demand.
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enough support. A one-standard-deviation increase in asset prices increases investments by 6%
in a quarter and 2% in a month, which is not as significant as the effects of total uncertainty.
In the neoclassical theory, price is considered the first determinant of investments.
These results indicate that, at least in the short-run, price may not be a significant determinant.
Another possibility is that the "recession-induced constructions" shown by Grenadier (1996) are
mixed with the "normal" behavior explained with the neoclassical theory. Grenadier shows that
the construction boom and price decline may occur almost simultaneously under certain
conditions because it may be optimal to exercise development options in the face of recession in
a duopolistic market. If this is the case, the weak result of price coefficient is not inconsistent
with real-options theory.
Interest rates (r) do not seem to have any significant effect on investment. Coefficients
are not significant in any series. This is not inconsistent with neoclassical theory, which predicts
no effect of interest rates on the supply schedule, and it does not provide enough support on the
real-options theory. Although weak, Short Series 2 shows a positive effect at the 20% level (i.e.
slightly supportive to the option-based model).
The effect of construction cost (K) is somewhat puzzling. Both theories expect
construction cost to have a negative effect on investment. Although the Long Series and Short
Series 1 indicate negative effects, they are not statistically significant. The coefficient of Short
Series 2 is statistically significant at the 1% level, but positive. This may be because Short
Series 2 is expressed in nominal terms. As for the first difference of construction cost (AK)
during the test period of Short Series 2, almost a half of the data are negative in real series while
only a third are negative in nominal series. This large difference in signs is only seen in
construction cost. Therefore, the coefficient of construction cost may be disturbed by
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inflation/deflation. Another possible cause of the weak result is the mismatch between the
investment and construction cost. Somerville (1999) emphasizes the importance of quality
control in construction cost series in estimating the supply schedule in order to avoid biases. To
fully control the quality of the buildings, more detailed micro data are necessary.
Last, expected growth rate (g) offers an interesting result. All series show positive
parameters although the option-based model predicts negative ones. Especially, the two Short
Series give significant results well above the 1% level. In fact, this result is consistent with
Holland, Ott and Riddiough (1999), whose method of estimation I use. According to them,
lagged changes in GDP may be picking up transitory, as opposed to permanent, changes in
expected cash flow. If this is the case, developers may see a temporary growth in cash flows and
"rush in" their projects to capture the benefit of temporarily favorable economic conditions. To
put it another way, it is considered that a temporary increase in growth decreases the value of
option to wait, resulting in an increase in investment. The current Japanese market may be in the
opposite state, in which temporarily decreased growth expectation encourages developers to
wait for a while. Therefore, this result may not inconsistent with the option-based model.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the results of the examination strongly support the
option-based investment model. It is confirmed that the total uncertainty has significant negative
effects on aggregate investments with a considerable magnitude. The effects of other variables
are also almost supportive to the option-based model. Although some parameters do not provide
decisive evidence, most parameters significantly support the option-based model.
Extension
As an extension, I also estimate the demand equation using Two Stage Least Square
method. The estimated parameters and the signs predicted by the option-based model are shown
in Table 3.
The results on the demand side also strongly support the option-based investment
model. The option-based model and the neoclassical model predict the same signs except for
total uncertainty. The fact that the coefficients of total uncertainty are positive and statistically
significant (at least at the 2% level) after controlling for systematic risk shows that the real
estate asset market takes into account the value of real options embedded in built assets such as
abandonment option and redevelopment option. The result clearly shows that not only
systematic risk but also total uncertainty affects asset value if real options are embedded in the
asset. The sizes of the coefficient indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in total
uncertainty raises the asset value by 12% on a quarterly basis and 7% on a monthly basis, which
are economically quite important.
The parameters of systematic risk (ap,m) are also all significant at least at the 10%
level. This result also supports the option-based model as well as the neoclassical model. The
sizes of the coefficients indicate that a one-standard deviation increase in systematic risk reduces
the asset value by 8% on a quarterly basis and from 2% to 5% on a monthly basis. It should be
noted that the signs of parameters of systematic risk and total uncertainty are opposite.
Therefore, even if systematic risk increases, the asset price may not decrease as much as the
neoclassical theory predicts if total uncertainty also increases.
The parameters of expected rent (R), interest rates (r) and expected growth (g) are also
significant and consistent with the predictions by both the option-based model and the
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neoclassical model. When the effects of interest rates on supply and demand are considered
together, lower interest rates may have positive effects on investments as predicted by the
neoclassical theory because demand is significantly affected by interest rates while supply is not
affected much either by interest rates or by asset price.
The parameters of investment (C) do not show a clear relationship between asset price
and the level of investments. Any lag is included based on the adjusted-R 2 criteria. In an
inefficient market or in a market that is not perfectly competitive, investors are considered to
take into account the level of the new asset supply. This contradictory result may be because the
data sets for investments do not work enough as information variables. It is highly likely that the
investors react before the actual construction starts using preceding information such as
government approval and development plan. The fact that the only the current variables are
finally included in the equations implies that the old information does not matter. I use the
amount of actual construction or investments as C because the main focus of this paper is on the
supply side. It is necessary to examine whether the investment variable really represents the
information for investors when the demand equation is mainly considered.
Table 3: Estimates of the Structural Demand Equation
Predicted Long Series Short Series 1 Short Series 2
signs 1974:4-1998:2 1982:4-1998:11 1986:2-1998:11
aCo (Constant) 2.32x10-2  -6.18x10-3 ----
(1.33x10-2 ) (5.37x10-3)
ci (for XAC - -1.02x10-1 -9.23x10-2  1.77x10'
(Investments)) (9.08x10-2) (1.16x10-) (1.84x10')
c2 (for EAR + 1.03 9.10x10-1 9.13x10'
(Expected Rent)) (1.71x10'-) (1.20x10-) (1.18x10I)
aX3 (for XAr (Risk-free ---- -2.72 -8.50
Rate of Interest)) (1.18) (2.91)
cX4 (for XAg (Expected + 2.76 ---- 2.76
Growth)) (1.31) (1.71)
as (for 1Aap,m - -7.86x10 2  -2.54x10 2  -7.66x10'
(Systematic Risk)) (2.90x 102) (1.35x10 2) (4.41x 10')
a 6 (for XAaY (Total + 2.43x10' 1.08x10' 8.65
Uncertainty)) (7.40) (4.58) (2.22)
R2  0.75 0.63 0.74
Adjusted- R2 0.70 0.58 0.69
S. E. of Regression 0.08 0.06 0.05
Durbin-Watson 1.93 1.99 2.03
The dependent variable is the change in the log of stock price index for real estate industry
obtained from the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The coefficients of seasonal dummies are not shown.
Coefficient standard errors are in parenthesis.
Implications
The results obtained in this paper have important implications on macro-economy and
public policy. First, the fact that real estate developers implicitly consider the option value to
wait makes clear the puzzles presented in Section 1.
Why does the monetary policy of extremely low interest rates fail to stimulate
investments? Although the low interest rates must have some stimulating effects on investments,
the increased level of uncertainty and temporarily decreased growth expectation have
overwhelming negative effects on investments through the increased value of option to wait.
Therefore, if it is necessary to stimulate investments, the government is strongly encouraged to
stabilize the economy and society to reduce uncertainty.
Why do Japanese firms tend to ignore the traditional Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
model in their capital budgeting? Firms implicitly account for the value of real options and thus,
they adjust the result of DCF analysis. However, due to the lack of quantification of those option
values, it is difficult to distinguish the reasonable and unreasonable decisions. It must be quite
effective for a better decision-making to consider explicitly the value of real options.
Why do new constructions of real estate tend to show booms and busts? Construction
boom and bust are also predicted by real options theory 23. The firms that (implicitly) consider
the real options value tend to create big cycles. In the relatively inefficient and less competitive
real estate asset market, a rational exercise policy on development option is sometimes
"developing no later than others" in order to maximize profits or minimize losses. Therefore,
seemingly irrational boom and bust may be in fact the result of a rational choice.
22 The increased systematic risk has ambiguous effects on investments based on real-options theory since it shifts
the supply curve rightward while shifting the demand curve downward.
23 See Grenadier (1996) and Wang and Zhou (1999).
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Why do investors hesitate to invest after bad economic conditions even if the
conditions have recovered? In Japan, the empirical tests do not support Tobin's q strongly 24 .
There does not seem to be a convincing explanation yet. However, real options theory also
predicts this kind of hysteresis. Due to the opportunity cost to kill the option to wait, the
expected return must be sufficiently high in order to start investments. This high required return
results in seemingly unreasonable hesitancy even if the decisions are in fact rational. Therefore,
the implicit consideration of option value may be attributed to this puzzle in Japan.
2 4 See Asako et al. (1989)
7. Summary
This paper focuses on the underlying forces on the investment decision in the Japanese
real estate market. I first review the real-options theory and then examine the validity of the
option-based investment model as opposed to the neoclassical investment model in the decision-
making about commercial real estate development, using aggregate real estate data from Japan. I
particularly emphasize the effect of uncertainty because it is the central difference between the
two models.
I specify a structural model in order to incorporate the interactions between supply and
demand in the real estate asset market. This model does not limit the demand schedule to an
extreme case of infinite elasticity. In an asset market, which is usually not efficient and not
perfectly competitive, it is necessary to construct an equilibrium model to distinguish the effects
on supply and demand.
In order to conduct detailed empirical tests for a long period of time, I set three data
series. The Long Series uses quarterly data of 25 years and Short Series 1 and Short Series 2
uses monthly data of about 15 years. In the supply equation, I find strong evidence that supports
the option-based investment model. Especially, total uncertainty has significant effects on the
investment decision. A lag structure is also found in the effect of total uncertainty. The
parameters for other variables such as systematic risk, asset price, construction cost, risk-free
rate of interest and expected growth also generally favor the option-based model. In the demand
equation, too, the results strongly support the option-based investment model.
It should be concluded from these results that the real options significantly affect real
estate investments in Japan, and thus, various kinds of real options must be incorporated in
investment and economic models for the use of business, academics or public policy.
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APPENDIX:
Summary of the Japanese economic history since the 1960's:
1965-74
1969
1969-74
1971-1973
1973
1973
1975
1975-84
1977
1980
1981-89
1981-91
1983-
1984-91
1985/5
1986
1986-89
1986/12-91/2
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1993
1994
1995-
The period of high growth (1965/10-70/7 Izanagi Economic Boom)
The New Comprehensive National Development Plan
Tight office space market (vacancy rates in Tokyo are less than 1%)
Nationwide Construction Boom
The First Oil Crisis
The second baby boom
Low capacity utilization
The period of stable growth (true in stock price)
The Third Comprehensive National Development Plan
The Second Oil Crisis
Excess liquidity in money market (high growth in money supply
(M2+CD))
Large inflow of people into Tokyo
Active equity finance, globalization of Tokyo financial market
Surge in demand for office space especially in Tokyo (vacancy rates
are less than 0.4%)
Plaza Agreement + Appreciation of yen
BOJ startsto cut interest rates
Surge in stock price (peaked on Dec 29, 1989)
Heisei Economic Boom or "Bubble Economy"
The Fourth Comprehensive National Development Plan -predicted
the surge in the demand of office space
Real GDP growth of 6% and land price appreciation of more than
20%
BOJ starts to raise interest rates
The stock market crashes. A peak of long-term interest rate
Change in Land Price Tax and Property Sales Tax. Stabilized money
supply. Crash of real estate markets and large decrease in GDP
growth (peak = 1991/2)
Low capacity utilization. Inflow of people into Tokyo stopped.
Change in the tax base of Property Tax
Disinflation
Expansion:
1965/10-1970/7
Recession:
1970/8-1971/12
Expansion:
1971/12-1973/11
Recession:
1973/12-1975/3
Expansion:
1975/4-1977/1
Recession:
[97/2_977/10
Expansion:
1977/11-1980/2
Recession:
1980/3-1983/2
Expansion:
1983/3-1985/6
Recession:
1985/7-1986/11
Expansion:
1986/12-1991/2
Recession:
1991/3-
